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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE
Guidelines) and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on
Environmental and Social Sustainability (IFC
Performance Standards) are widely viewed as
key international standards to which extractive
companies operating internationally should
comply. Indeed, these standards, together with
the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs),
are promoted by Canada in its November
2014 enhanced corporate social responsibility
(CSR) strategy for extractive sector companies
operating abroad. The strategy states that the
Canadian government expects companies
operating outside of Canada to “respect human
rights and all applicable laws, and to meet
or exceed widely-recognized international
standards for responsible business conduct”.
Yet the OECD and the IFC take distinct
approaches to the embedding of indigenous
rights and environmental rights, two categories
of human rights commonly affected by extractive
company operations. For example, the OECD
MNE Guidelines address human rights and

environment in different guidelines, and there
are no specific guidelines concerning the rights
of indigenous peoples. The IFC Performance
Standards, on the other hand, refers to human
rights only briefly in the first performance
standard as part of its social risk assessment,
but provides more detailed standards on various
environmental and social matters including
biodiversity conservation, pollution prevention
and indigenous peoples’ rights. However, in early
2016, the OECD released a Due Diligence
Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder
Engagement in the Extractives Sector (OECD
Stakeholder Engagement Guidance) designed
to provide practical guidance in line with the
OECD MNE Guidelines. This paper will
examine the commonalities and differences
between the IFC and OECD approaches to the
integration of business responsibilities for human
rights with a focus on procedural environmental
rights and the right of indigenous peoples to free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIC). The paper
will also briefly assess the potential effectiveness
of these instruments in light of associated
compliance mechanisms.

Titre francophone : Droits autochtones, droits environnementaux, ou engagement des parties prenantes?
Une comparaison des approches de la IFC et de l’OCDE quant à la mise en oeuvre de la responsabilité
des entreprises de respecter les droits de l’homme.
*
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Les principes directeurs de l’Organisation
de Coopération et de Développement
Économiques (OCDE) à l’intention des
entreprises multinationales ainsi que les
normes de performance en matière de
durabilité environnementale et sociale de la
Société Financière Internationale (SFI) sont
généralement considérés comme des normes
internationales fondamentales auxquelles
doivent se conformer les compagnies du secteur
extractif actives à l’étranger. Ces normes, ainsi
que les principes directeurs relatifs aux entreprises
et aux droits humains des Nations Unies, ont été
promues par le Canada en novembre 2014 à
travers la stratégie améliorée du Canada relative
à la responsabilité sociale des entreprises. Cette
stratégie affirme que le gouvernement canadien
s’attend à ce que les compagnies opérant à
l’étranger « respectent les droits de la personne,
ainsi que toutes les lois applicables, et qu’elles
satisfassent - et même surpassent - les normes
internationales généralement reconnues en
matière de conduite responsable des affaires ».
Cependant, l’OCDE et la SFI adoptent des
approches distinctes quant à l’incorporation
des droits des Autochtones et des droits
environnementaux, deux catégories de droits
humains les plus touchées par l’opération
d’entreprises du secteur extractif. Par exemple,

les principes directeurs de l’OCDE traitent des
droits humains et des droits environnementaux
dans différents principes, sans faire mention
des droits des Autochtones. En revanche, les
normes de performance de la SFI, quoique ne
référant que brièvement aux droits humains
dans la Norme de performance 1 dans le
contexte de l’évaluation des risques sur le plan
social, offre toutefois des normes plus détaillées
au niveau environnemental et social incluant la
conservation de la biodiversité, la prévention de
la pollution et les peuples autochtones. En avril
2015, l’OCDE a publié pour examen public
une ébauche de son guide d’engagement pour
parties prenantes dans le secteur extractif. Cet
article examinera les similarités et les différences
entre les approches de l’OCDE et de la SFI en
ce qui concerne l’intégration de la responsabilité
qu’ont les entreprises vis-à-vis des droits humains.
Seront examinés plus particulièrement les droits
procéduraux destinés à renforcer la protection de
l’environnement ainsi que le droit des peuples
autochtones au consentement préalable, libre et
éclairé. Cet article évaluera également l’efficacité
potentielle de ces deux approches à la lumière des
mécanismes de conformité associés.
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1. Introduction

T

he importance of respect for indigenous rights and local community environmental
rights for mining, oil, and gas companies operating internationally cannot be
understated. From a company’s perspective, empirical evidence has documented
the extensive financial costs of conflict between companies and communities—conflicts
often fuelled by environmental concerns and lack of community consent.1 From a local
community perspective, such conflicts can, depending on the country context, culminate in
the imprisonment of community members, or, far too frequently, the killing of environmental
human rights defenders.2 In countries with weak protection and enforcement of indigenous or
environmental rights, a company’s ability to steer clear of such deadly conflicts is dependent
1

Rachel Davis & Daniel M Franks, “Costs of Company-Community Conflict in the Extractive Sector”
(2014) 66 Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Report No 66, online: Harvard Kennedy School
<www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/research/Costs%20of%20Conflict_Davis%20%20Franks.pdf>;
Daniel M Franks et al, “Conflict Translates Environmental and Social Risk into Business Costs” (2014)
111:21 Proceedings National Academy of Sciences 7576.

2

Center for International Environmental Law, “Environmental Defenders Describe Human Rights Abuses
Linked with the Mining Industry” (25 October 2010), online: <www.ciel.org/news/environmentaldefenders-describe-human-rights-abuses-linked-with-the-mining-industry-at-the-inter-americancommission-on-human-rights/>; Global Witness, “How Many More? 2014’s Deadly Environment: The
Killing and Intimidation of Environmental and Land Activists, with a Spotlight on Honduras” (20 April
2014), online: Global Witness <www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/howmany-more> [Global Witness]; Jona Razzaque, “Human Rights to a Clean Environment: Procedural
Right”, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong & Panos Merkouris, eds, Research Handbook on
International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010) 28.
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upon its ability to seek comprehensive and practical rights-respecting guidance. When industry
understandings of environmental and indigenous rights deviate from the understandings
accepted by local communities, the consequences for those engaged in peaceful protest are
severe.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE Guidelines)3 and the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability (IFC Performance
Standards)4 are widely viewed as important international standards for guiding responsible
transnational business conduct.5 Indeed, both are recommended to Canadian extractive
companies operating internationally by Global Affairs Canada (previously the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development) in a 2014 policy document entitled Doing Business
the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive
Sector Abroad (2014 Strategy).6 These standards forward, to differing degrees, that businesses
have a responsibility to respect human rights in accordance with the United Nations (UN)
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), endorsed by the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2011.7
Both the OECD MNE Guidelines and IFC Performance Standards have the potential
to play an important role in providing guidance to extractive companies on respect for
human rights throughout their global operations. Yet, the internationally recognized right of
indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) under international law is
understood differently under international law than procedural environmental rights of nonindigenous local individuals and communities. Moreover, not all peoples who self-identify as
indigenous are recognized as such by the state within which they live.8 From the perspective
of an extractive company operating internationally, it should, in principle, be important to
3

OECD, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, (2011)
[MNE Guidelines].

4

International Finance Corporation, Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability
(Washington, DC: International Finance Corporation, 2012) [IFC, Performance Standards].

5

See generally Elisa Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009) at 105–113, 117–118, and ch 7, especially 169–171; Penelope Simons &
Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights, and the Home State Advantage
(New York: Routledge, 2014) at ch 3.

6

Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social
Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada, 2014) at 6–7 [Doing
Business the Canadian Way].

7

Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” Framework, UNHRC GAOR, 17th Sess, Annex, Agenda Item 3, A/HRC/17/31 (2011)
[UNGPs]; United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, News Release, “New
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council” (2011),
online: <www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11164#sthash.IaErqwjG.
dpuf>.

8

See e.g. Michael C Davis, “China and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Case
of Tibet” in Mark Woons, ed, Restoring Indigenous Self-Determination Theoretical and Practical Approaches
(Bristol: E-International Relations, 2014) 96; Jérèmie Gilbert, “Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in
Africa: The Pragmatic Revolution of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2011)
60:1 ICLQ 245.
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understand when FPIC is required in order to comply with the business responsibility to
respect rights under international law, as distinct from similar yet distinct consultation and
participation requirements for a non-indigenous local community or individuals . In theory,
widely endorsed international standards for extractive companies should make this distinction
clear. In practice, however, this distinction is not evident. While the IFC Performance Standards
include a standard dedicated to indigenous rights, the OECD MNE Guidelines provide no
specific guidance with regard to indigenous rights. Both standards approach environmental
issues in distinct ways. Notably, in April 2015, the OECD posted the Due Diligence Guidance
for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractives Sector draft for comment that for
the first time provides concrete recognition of indigenous rights, with the final text (OECD
Stakeholder Engagement Guidance) published in 2016.9
This paper will first briefly explore Canada’s promotion of these international standards
in light of its key role in global mining, then examine international law’s conceptualization
of the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC as distinct from procedural environmental rights.
Second, the paper will compare the approach taken to the embedding of these rights, and
the business responsibility to respect rights in the IFC Performance Standards and the OECD
MNE Guidelines. The implementation of these rights will also be assessed through a brief
examination of compliance mechanism decisions associated with each standard. Finally, the
OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance will be explored in order to determine whether it serves
to align the OECD’s approach with that of the IFC, or whether it confirms a different path.
While in theory indigenous rights to FPIC and local community participatory environmental
rights should be carefully distinguished in these standards, the reality suggests a blurring of
these rights and their legal status. The paper will conclude by speculating upon why this might
be, and offering recommendations for future research.
2. Canada, Environmental Rights, and Indigenous Rights
2.1. Canadian Mining Internationally
Canada is known as an important player in global mining and exploration. In 2013, more
than half of the “publically listed exploration and mining companies” in the world had their
headquarters in Canada.10 Canada also plays a lead role in the Intergovernmental Forum on
Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, an initiative that brings together
governments from around the world to develop policy for sustainable mineral development.11
Countries representing a diverse range of mineral-rich states from both the North and South
9

OECD Secretariat, Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractives Sector,
Draft for comment (2015) at 4, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Guidance-ExtractivesSector-Stakeholder-Engagement.pdf > [OECD Draft Stakeholder Engagement]; OECD Secretariat,
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractive Sector, (2016),
online: <mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Guidance-Extractives-Sector-Stakeholder-Engagement.pdf>
[OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance].

10

Doing Business the Canadian Way, supra note 6 at 2. In the same year, Canadian-headquartered companies
undertook nearly 31% of global expenditures on mining exploration.

11

See generally, Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development,
Terms of Reference, online: <globaldialogue.info/TOREnglish2013.pdf> and Introduction, online:
<globaldialogue.info/intro_e.htm>. The Intergovernmental Forum was the outcome of the Global
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participated in the drafting of a Mining Policy Framework in 2010, updated in 2013.12 This
framework is said to outline the “best practices required for good environmental, social and
economic governance of the mining sector and the generation and equitable sharing of benefits
in a manner that will contribute to sustainable development.”13 It highlights the need to respect
human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples,14 and encourages governments and
“mining entities” to “respect the spirit and intent of current and future international normative
language such as is found in the [IFC Performance Standards].”15 Should a conflict break out
where there is an operating mine, “governments and operating entities should act to protect
human rights and ensure the safety of miners, their families and communities in accordance
with the OECD guidelines.”16 Environmental management standards and post-mining
transition, including remediation, are addressed separately.17
Despite Canada’s promotion of best practices in the governance of sustainable mineral
development by host states internationally,18 Canadian mining companies have been at times
implicated or alleged to be implicated in violations of the rights of local and indigenous
communities, including tragic incidents where peaceful protests over violations of rights to
consultation and consent end in violence.19 Indeed, despite constitutional protections of
Dialogue, a Partnership Initiative co-sponsored by South Africa and Canada as an outcome of the 2002
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development.
12

Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, A Mining
Policy Framework: Mining and Sustainable Development (2013) at 3–4, online: <globaldialogue.info/
MPFOct2013.pdf>. State members are largely from the global south, including several BRICS countries
(Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, but not China), as well as many economically poor countries
(such as Sierra Leone, Bolivia, and Papua New Guinea). By 2013, forty-seven countries participated in
this initiative.

13

Ibid at 6.

14

Ibid at 11. Cultural heritage rights are also singled out here.

15

Ibid at 11, 34–35.

16

Ibid at 11, 34–35. This comment appears in the context of addressing potential security issues, and
reference is made to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (at 35), another international
standard identified and endorsed in both the 2009 and 2014 Strategies. See Doing Business the Canadian
Way, supra note 6 at 7; Sara L Seck, “Canadian Mining Internationally and the UN Guiding Principles
for Business and Human Rights” (2011), 49 Can YB Intl L 51 at 76–77 [Seck “Canadian Mining
Internationally”], citing Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Building the
Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for the Canadian Extractive Sector (Ottawa:
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 26 March 2009).

17

Ibid at 11–15, 35–41. The IFC Performance standards are referred to as guidance for mine closure. The
IFC Performance standards are referred to as guidance for mine closure.

18

In addition to Canada’s role in the Intergovernmental Forum, the Canadian government has provided
$25 million in funding support to the Canadian International Resources and Development Initiative
(CIRDI) in order to “foster dialogue, training and research, and promote best practices to support
developing countries to enhance their capacity to manage their natural resource sector.” Doing Business the
Canadian Way, supra note 6 at 16. See further CIRDI, About, online: Canadian International Resources
and Development Institute <cirdi.ca/about/>. This initiative has been the subject of critique. See e.g.
Stop the Institute/CIRDI, online: <stoptheinstitute.ca>.

19

See e.g. Inter-Am Comm HR, Thematic Hearing from 153rd Period of Sessions, Human Rights,
Indigenous Rights and Canada’s Extraterritorial Obligations, (October 28 2014) at 10, online: <cnca-rcrce.
ca/wp-content/uploads/canada_mining_cidh_oct_28_2014_final.pdf> [CNCA Report]. See also Choc
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aboriginal rights, similar confrontations have occurred within Canada in recent years.20 In
addition, abroad or at home, mining has resulted in environmental harms that have not been
remediated, with associated violations of environmental rights.21 Moreover, 2012 amendments
to federal environmental assessment laws have weakened procedural environmental rights
protections domestically, a problem that the current federal government has promised to fix.22
Beyond best practices, it is often argued that home states like Canada have an obligation
under international law to regulate companies operating abroad to prevent and remedy
violations of human rights.23 This particularly applies in the mining sector, as international
operations do not happen without home state support, whether through financial support
provided by export credit agencies, private financial institutions, or listing on a stock exchange,
or through trade commissioner support provided directly by the federal government.24
However, the implementation of “hard law” regulation has for the most part been resisted.25
v Hudbay Minerals Inc, 2013 ONSC 1414, 116 OR (3d) 674 [Choc]; Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining
Corporation, 2011 ONCA 191, [2011] OJ No 1041, aff’g 2010 ONSC 2421, [2010] OJ No 2239;
Canadian Centre for International Justice, Q & A: The Case Against Canada’s Tahoe Resources Inc (CCIJ,
2014), online: <www.ccij.ca/content/uploads/2015/07/Tahoe-QA-Filing-18-June-2014-FINAL.pdf>.
20

See Rachel Ariss with John Cutfeet, Keeping the Land: Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, Reconciliation
and Canadian Law (Black Point: Fernwood Publishing, 2012) (describing the 2006 confrontation with
mineral exploration company Platinex, which resulted in the jailing of aboriginal community leaders).

21

See for example the discussion of environment issues and associated human rights violations at the
Omai mine in Guyana and the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea, both of which involved foreign
direct investment from Canadian mining companies (albeit to differing degrees). See e.g. Amnesty
International, Injustice Incorporated: Corporate Abuses and the Human Right to Remedy (March 2014)
at 65–78, 81–94, online: <www.amnesty.org/en/documents/POL30/001/2014/en/>. These problems
frequently arose in the past in Canada. See e.g. National Orphaned/Abandoned Mines Initiative, online:
<www.abandoned-mines.org>; Abandoned Mines Project, online: <www.abandonedminesnc.com/>.
Tailings spills, while rare, still arise at Canadian mines today. See the recent 2014 Mount Polley tailings
spill in British Columbia: British Columbia, Ministry of Environment, “Mount Polley Mine Tailings
Dam Breach, Likely” (4 August 2014), online: <www.env.gov.bc.ca/epd/mount-polley>. See also United
Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, News Release, “Brazilian mine disaster: “This
is not the time for defensive posturing” – UN rights experts” (25 November 2015), online: <www.ohchr.
org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16803&LangID=E>.

22

Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA As We Know It?” (2012) 24:1 J Envtl L
& Prac 1; Robert B Gibson, “In Full Retreat: the Canadian Government’s New Environmental
Assessment Law Undoes Decades of Progress” (2012) 30:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal
179. See also Mandate Letter from the Office of the Prime Minister to the Minister of Environment
and Climate Change (2016), online: Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau <pm.gc.ca/eng/
minister-environment-and-climate-change-mandate-letter>.

23

Sara L Seck, “Conceptualizing the Home State Duty to Protect Human Rights” in Karin Buhman, Mette
Morsing & Lynn Roseberry, eds, Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities: Global Legal and
Management Perspectives (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 25 [Seck “Conceptualizing”]; Sara L
Seck, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008) 11 Yale
Human Rts & Dev LJ 177 [Seck “Local Communities”].

24

Seck, “Conceptualizing”, supra note 23 at 45–46; CNCA Report, supra note 19 at 7–9; Simons &
Macklin, supra note 5 at 260–264, 280–290.

25

Seck “Canadian Mining Internationally”, supra note 16 at 66-75; Simons and Macklin, ibid at 260-264;
Richard Janda, “An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in
Developing Countries (Bill C-300): Anatomy of a Failed Initiative” (2010) 6:2 JSDLP 97.
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Instead, in November 2014, Canada announced an enhanced corporate social responsibility
(CSR) strategy for extractive sector companies operating abroad.26 The revised 2014 Strategy
builds upon an earlier strategy dating from 2009, which was the subject of much criticism
due in part to the weak mandate of the CSR counsellor who was tasked with the resolution
of disputes.27 Among the changes introduced in the 2014 Strategy are a revisiting of the role
of the CSR counsellor, and the proposed withdrawal of “economic diplomacy” support from
companies that fail to participate in dispute resolution procedures or are found “not to be
embodying CSR best practices.”28
The 2014 Strategy states explicitly that the Canadian government expects companies
operating outside of Canada to “respect human rights and all applicable laws, and to meet
or exceed widely-recognized international standards for responsible business conduct.”29
This change is a response to the UNHRC’s 2011 endorsement of the UNGPs,30 which are
also included in the 2014 Strategy’s updated reference list of international guidelines and
standards.31 The UNGPs consist of three pillars of polycentric governance: (1) the state duty to
protect human rights from violations by businesses; (2) the independent business responsibility
to respect human rights; (3) and the need for access to judicial and non-judicial remedy for
victims.32 According to the UNGPs, the responsibility to respect applies to all businesses
26

Doing Business the Canadian Way, supra note 6.

27

For a description of the CSR strategy cf Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for the Canadian Extractive
Sector (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 26 March 2009); Seck, “Canadian
Mining Internationally”, supra note 16 at 85. Among other concerns was the fact that company consent
was required before the CSR Counsellor could consider a complaint, and no consequences flowed from
a company’s failure to participate.

28

Doing Business the Canadian Way, supra note 6 at 12–13. Companies designated as not embodying CSR
best practice will also have this designation taken into account when seeking financing through Export
Development Canada. On the other hand, companies that do align with the CSR guidance “will be
recognized by the CSR Counsellor’s office as eligible for enhanced Government of Canada economic
diplomacy” (ibid). For a full analysis of the 2014 Strategy, se Penelope Simons, “Canada’s Enhanced CSR
Strategy: Human Rights Due Diligence and Access to Justice for Victims of Extraterritorial Corporate
Human Rights Abuses” (2015) 56:2 Can Bus LJ 167 [Simons “Canada’s Enhanced”].

29

Doing Business the Canadian Way, supra note 6 at 3.

30

See generally Radu Mares, ed, The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations
and Implementation (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). See also Surya Deva & David Bilchitz,
eds, Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).

31

Doing Business the Canadian Way, supra note 6 at 6. A second new standard introduced in 2014 is the
OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and
High-Risk Areas (2011). Canada “played a leading role in negotiating the Guidance document” and
“chairs the OECD forum on responsible mineral supply chains as well as the Multi-stakeholder Steering
Group which oversees the initiative.” Ibid at 7.

32

UNGPs, supra note 7 at 1. While the state duty to protect is rooted in existing international human
rights law, the business responsibility to respect rights arises from the expectations of society, and should
be treated as a legal compliance issue. The classification of the business responsibility as a social rather
than legal norm has been critiqued. See e.g. Carlos López, “The ‘Ruggie Process’: from Legal Obligations
to Corporate Social Responsibility?” in Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds, Human Rights Obligations of
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
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and all human rights, with the understanding that the specific rights and the extent of the
responsibility will depend in part upon industry context.33
As well as serving as an independent standard in the 2014 Strategy, the business
responsibility to respect human rights has been embedded to differing degrees in other
international standards that feature prominently in both the 2009 and 2014 Strategy, including
both the OECD MNE Guidelines and the IFC Performance Standards.34 Although the 2014
Strategy frames compliance with these standards as voluntary, it is important to recognize that
in addition to the implementation of incentives such as conditionality of financing and trade
commissioner support proposed in the 2014 Strategy, these standards may also be hardened
by explicit incorporation in contractual agreements or used to inform the standard of care in
tort.35 Accordingly, while the relationship between international CSR standards and law is
contested, there is increasingly little doubt that the human rights dimensions of these standards
are legally relevant.36
2.2. Environmental Rights, Indigenous Rights, and International Law
Both environmental rights and indigenous rights have been recognized in sources of
international law. This part will explore each in turn, with explicit reference to recent reports
by UN human rights special procedures mandate holders on environmental rights and
indigenous rights. While many alternative sources could support an exploration of indigenous
rights, Professor John Knox, the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment appointed in
March 2012, provides a recent and authoritative mapping of environmental rights which more
easily allows for a comparison with indigenous rights.37 Moreover, as part of this mapping
58. However, others argue that the widespread endorsement of the UNGPs “transforms CSR strategy
from public relations art to legal science by creating a new CSR paradigm driven by systemic precision
based on legal concepts – one that is justiciable in a way that traditional CSR never could be.” See
Yousuf Astab, “The Intersection of Law and Corporate Social Responsibility: Human Rights Strategy and
Litigation Readiness for Extractive-Sector Companies” (2014) 60 Rocky Mountain Mineral L Institute
1.
33

UNGPs, supra note 7 at 13–14. To be in compliance with the business responsibility to respect rights, a
company must “know and show” that it accepts this responsibility, by adopting a human rights policy,
undertaking human rights due diligence, and ensuring remedy for violations.

34

Sara L Seck, “Business, Human Rights, and Canadian Mining Lawyers” (2015) 56:2 Can Bus LJ 208 at
216–224 [Seck, “Business and Human Rights”].

35

On contractual aspects see Michael Torrance, ed, IFC Performance Standards on Environmental &
Social Sustainability: A Guidebook (Markham, Canada: LexisNexis Canada, 2012) at 18–19; on CSR
frameworks and the standard of care in transnational corporate accountability tort litigation, see Choc,
supra note 19. See also Astab, supra note 32.

36

Seck “Business and Human Rights”, supra note 34 at 234–237. See also John Morrison, The Social License:
How to Keep Your Organization Legitimate (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014); Michael Torrance,
“Persuasive Authority Beyond the State: A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility Norms
as Legal Reasons within Positivist Legal Systems” (2011) 12:8 German LJ 1573.

37

Human Rights and the Environment, GA Res 19/10, UNHRCGAOR, 19th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/
RES/19/10 (2012). John H Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, John H. Knox Mapping Report,
UNHRCGAOR, 25th Sess, (2013) A/HRC/25/53 1 at paras 4, 20, online: United Nations Mandate on
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process and in order to provide a cross-cutting analysis, Knox examined reports of Professor
James Anaya, the (former) UNHRC mandate holder on indigenous rights, who had just issued
a cutting edge report on indigenous rights and extractive industries.38
The UN special procedures mandate holders have been described by former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan as “the crown jewel[s] of the [UN human rights] system.”39
Thematic mandate holders, which have grown exponentially in number from three in
1985 to 41 today,40 are prominent independent human rights experts who thematically
study human rights concerns (rather than country-specific concerns), and “may contribute
to the development of human rights standards.”41 The first special rapporteur on the rights
of indigenous peoples was appointed in 2001 and Professor Anaya held the position from
2008 to 2014.42 A special rapporteur on human rights and the environment was appointed in
1990 and issued yearly reports until 1994, including draft articles on human rights and the
environment.43 The appointment of Professor Knox in 2012 marked the first time since 1994
that the relationship between human rights and the environment was squarely on the agenda
of a thematic mandate holder.44 Notably, the UNGPs were the product of Special Procedures
Mandate Holder Professor John Ruggie, who held the position of special representative for
business and human rights from 2005 to 2011. Accordingly, recent reports by thematic
mandate holders will inform the analysis below.
2.2.1. Environmental Rights

Human Rights and the Environment <srenvironment.org/mapping-report-2014-2/c> [Knox, Mapping
Report]. This mapping report was presented at the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council in
March 2014.
38

John H Knox, Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy
and Sustainable Environment: Individual Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, December 2013 at 6,
online: United Nations Mandate on Human Rights and the Environment <srenvironment.org/mappingreport-2014-2/> [Knox, Indigenous Rights].

39

Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston, & Ryan Goodman, eds, International Human Rights in Context: Law,
Politics, Morals, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 765.

40

Ibid at 766; UNOHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (2015), online: <ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx> [Special Procedures HRC].

41

Ibid.

42

UNOHCHR, “Current Mandate Holders”, online:
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/
Currentmandateholders.aspx>. The current Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples is
Ms. Victoria Lucia Tauli-Corpuz.

43

See discussion of the work of Ms Fatima Zhora Ksentini, including Draft Articles on Human Rights and
Environment in Sumudu Atapattu, “The Right to Life or the Right to Die Polluted: The Emergence of a
Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under International Law” (2002) 16 Tul Envtl LJ 65 at 78–83.

44

UNOHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally
sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, online: <ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Environment/ToxicWastes/Pages/SRToxicWastesIndex.aspx>. However, since 1995, a Special Rapporteur
has considered the implications for human rights of the dumping and management of toxic substances
and hazardous wastes. See especially Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights obligations
related to the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and waste, Calin
Georgescu, Extractive Industries Report, UN HRC A/HRC/21/48 (2 July 2012).
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International law’s recognition of human rights to environmental protection is often
said to distinguish between substantive rights,45 and procedural rights.46 While the linkage
between environmental harm and human rights has been clearly established in international
environmental law since at least 1972, many human rights treaties drafted before this time do
not provide direct references to environmental rights.47 However, recent international human
rights treaties and two regional treaties specifically guarantee substantive environmental human
rights, as do more than 100 national constitutions, which often use explicit language such as a
“right to a clean and healthy environment.”48 Where substantive environmental rights are not
explicitly found in formal texts, global and regional human rights bodies have interpreted rights
to life, health, and property, among others, as providing protection for environmental concerns,
balanced against a government’s desire for economic development.49 Moreover, procedural
environmental rights to access information, participate in decision making, and access justice
serve to support the realization of substantive rights.50 International environmental law has
recognized procedural environmental rights most notably in principle 10 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration and the 1998 Aarhus Convention, as well as in many other sources of international,
regional, and national law.51
The 2013 report of Professor Knox, the independent expert on human rights and
environment, provides a “mapping” of human rights obligations relating to the environment,
and notes that states and tribunals have identified mining and large-scale oil operations as
threatening the enjoyment of the right to a healthy or satisfactory environment.52 Improper
disposal of toxic wastes and hazardous substances from extractive operations are also identified
as threatening the right to health and the right to water.53 Pollution and habitat loss more
generally threaten the right to food.54 Women, children, and indigenous peoples may be more

45

Dinah Shelton, “Human Rights and the Environment: Substantive Rights” in Fitzmaurice et al, supra
note 2 at 265.

46

Razzaque, supra note 2 at 284. See generally Benjamin Richardson & Jona Razzaque, “Public participation
in environmental decision-making” in Benjamin Richardson & Stepan Wood, eds, Environmental Law
for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) 165.

47

Shelton, supra note 45 at 265–266. See also Atapattu, supra note 43 (providing a history of the emergence
of a human rights to a healthy environment in sources of both international environmental and human
rights law).

48

Shelton, supra note 45 at 266–267.
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Ibid at 278–279.
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Razzaque, supra note 46 at 284.
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Ibid at 285-292. See further Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNGAOR, 1992, UN
Doc A/CONF.151/26 vol.1, 31 ILM 874 (1992), Principle 10 [Rio Declaration]; Donald K Anton &
Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (New York City: Cambridge University
Press, 2011); Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447, 38 ILM 517 (1999) (entered into force
30 October 2001).

52

Knox, Mapping Report, supra note 37 at para 18.

53

Ibid at paras 20–21.
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vulnerable to infringements of the right to health by extractive industries.55 Extractive industry
operations thus have the potential to threaten a broad range of substantive environmental
rights, with specific rights dependent upon the context.
While all states may not have “formally accepted” all the norms identified in the 2013
report, the independent expert highlights that given the “diversity of the sources from which
they arise” and their “remarkabl[e] coheren[ce]”, they “provide strong evidence of converging
trends towards greater uniformity and certainty in the human rights obligations relating to
the environment.”56 Notably, the independent expert observes the striking agreement that
states have procedural obligations including “duties (a) to assess environmental impacts and
make environmental information public; (b) to facilitate public participation in environmental
decision-making, including by protecting the rights of expression and association; and (c) to
provide access to remedies for harm.”57 The independent expert notes the “special importance”
of “rights of freedom of expression and association” and the protection of life, liberty and
security of individuals exercising these rights in relation to public participation in environmental
decision making. This is due to the “extraordinary risks” facing human rights defenders who
work to protect the environment, land rights, and natural resources.58 This recognition
accords with the widely accepted recognition of public participation rights for individuals and
groups who face potential environmental impacts from the activities of extractive industries
found under international sustainable development law, whether or not they self-identify as
indigenous peoples.59
With regard to substantive rights protection, the independent expert concludes that
states are obligated to protect against environmental harm that interferes with the enjoyment
of a broad spectrum of human rights, including an obligation to adopt a legal framework
to protect against environmental harm, and to regulate private actors to protect against
such harms.60 A subsequent report of the independent expert confirms that the business
responsibility to respect human rights extends to “human rights abuses caused by pollution
55

Ibid at paras 23–25. See further ibid at paras 69–78 (obligations relating to members of groups in
vulnerable situations, women, children, indigenous peoples).
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Ibid at para 27.

57

Ibid at para 29. See further ibid at paras 30–35 (duties to assess environmental impacts and make
information public), 36–40 (duties to facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making),
41–43 (duty to provide access to legal remedies).

58

Ibid at paras 39–40 (referring to the work of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders). See Situation of Human Rights Defenders, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, UN Doc A/68/262 (2013)
at paras 15–18 [Situation of Human Rights Defenders]; Margaret Sekaggya, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/HRC/19/55 (21 December 2011) at
paras 60–87, 124–126.
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Donald N Zillman, Alastair R Lucas & George (Rock) Pring, eds, Human Rights in Natural Resource
Development: Public Participation in the Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002); Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UNGAOR
(2002), UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 at paras 10, 46; Penelope Simons & Lynda Collins, “Participatory
Rights in the Ontario Mining Sector: An International Human Rights Perspective” (2010) 6:2 JSDLP
177; Sara L Seck, “Transnational Corporations and Extractive Industries” in Shawkat Alam et al,
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or other environmental harm.”61 Accordingly, irrespective of a state’s compliance with its own
duty to protect environmental rights, it follows that companies should conduct human rights
due diligence to identify environmental rights holders and avoid violations. The business
responsibility to respect rights should logically apply equally to procedural and substantive
environmental rights.
2.2.2. Indigenous Rights
International law’s recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples is evident in many
sources, including the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.62
Recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC is also supported by many sources
of international law, and flows from the right to self-determination. Much has been written
about the contested meaning of FPIC,63 and many reports and academic commentaries have
explored FPIC in the context of extractive industries from a variety of perspectives.64
Professor Anaya, the former special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples,
concluded a comprehensive study of the impact of extractive industries on the rights of
indigenous peoples in 2013.65 According to Professor Anaya, while the procedural right to
FPIC is often given pre-eminence, it is also useful to identify the primary substantive rights
implicated by natural resource development and extraction. These include “rights to property,
culture, religion, and non-discrimination in relation to lands, territories and natural resources,
including sacred places and objects; rights to health and physical well-being in relation to a clean
and healthy environment; and rights to set and pursue priorities for development, including

61

John H Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment—John H Knox: Compilation of Good
Practices, UNGAOR, 28th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/28/61 (2015) at para 79.
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United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess,
Supp No 53, UN Doc A/61/53 (2007). See further Stephen Allen & Allexandra Xanthaki, eds, Reflections
on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
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For a particularly comprehensive and recent analysis of the sources and meaning of FPIC under
international law and its implications for resource extraction, see Cathal Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title
to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free Prior and Informed Consent (London:
Routledge, 2015).
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These include: Marcus Colchester & Fergus MacKay “In Search of Middle Ground Indigenous Peoples,
Collective Representation and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent” (Paper delivered at
the 10th conference of the International Association for the Study of of Common Property Oaxaca,
August 2004), (2004) Forest Peoples Programme, online: <www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/
publication/2010/08/fpicipsaug04eng.pdf>; Jill Cariño, “Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior,
Informed Consent: Reflections on Concepts and Practice” (2005) 22:1 Ariz J Intl J & Compl L 19; and
Cathal Doyle & Jill Cariño “Making Free Prior and Informed Consent a Reality: Indigenous Peoples
and the Extractive Sector” ( 2013), online: <www.ecojesuit.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MakingFPIC-a-Reality-Report.pdf>.
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See generally James Anaya, “Website archive of reports, statements, and news of the former Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya” (May 2014), online: <unsr.jamesanaya.
org>. See also Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Follow-up report on indigenous
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development of natural resources, as part of fundamental rights to self-determination”.66 With
regard to the right to FPIC, Anaya notes that there is a “general rule that extractive activities
should not take place within the territories of indigenous peoples without their free prior and
informed consent” and that the territories of indigenous peoples include:
lands that are in some form titled or reserved to them by the State, lands that they
traditionally own or possess under customary tenure (whether officially titled or
not), or other areas that are of cultural or religious significance to them or in which
they traditionally have access to resources that are important to their physical wellbeing or cultural practices.67

According to Professor Anaya, the preferred model is for natural resource extraction and
development to be undertaken by indigenous peoples themselves as an exercise of their right
to self-determination.68 However, the standard scenario is one in which states or businesses
promote extraction within indigenous territories.69 Under this scenario, indigenous individuals
and peoples have the right to “oppose and actively express opposition to extractive projects”
due in part to the “firmly established” rights of “freedom of expression and to participation.”70
Moreover, indigenous peoples “should be free from pressure from State or extractive company
agents to compel them to accept extractive projects” and “neither States nor companies need
or should insist on consultations” where indigenous peoples have “affirmatively withheld their
consent.”71
As a general rule, the consent of indigenous peoples on just terms is required for extractive
activities to proceed, absent a theoretical situation where there is conclusive proof that the
activities will have no substantial effect on the exercise of their substantive rights, or that
limitations on the exercise of their substantive rights are permissible under international human
rights law.72 Importantly, States have “asserted the power to expropriate indigenous property
interests in land or surface resources in order to have or permit access to the subsurface resources
to which the State claims ownership.”73 Yet Professor Anaya notes that even if expropriation
is “justly compensated,” it must be undertaken “pursuant to a valid public purpose” which
cannot be merely for “commercial interests or revenue-raising.”74 Moreover, “account must be
taken” of indigenous peoples’ rights to “subsurface resources within their own territories on
the basis of their own laws and customs, despite State law to the contrary.”75 Should a state
66

James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNHRCGAOR, 21st
Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47, (2012) at para 50 [Anaya, 2012 Report]. See also James Anaya, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya: Extractive industries and indigenous
peoples, UNHRCGAOR, 24th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, (2013) at para 28 [Anaya, 2013 Report].
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choose to proceed without indigenous peoples’ consent, it remains “bound to respect and
protect [their] rights” and “must ensure that other applicable safeguards are implemented.”76
These include taking steps to “minimize or offset the limitation on the rights through impact
assessments, measures of mitigation, compensation and benefit sharing” and undertaking
“good faith efforts to consult with indigenous peoples and to develop and reach agreement on
these measures, in keeping with its general duty to consult.”77 Thus, even though indigenous
peoples may affirmatively withhold consent, they do not appear to have the power to veto a
proposal, as states may still proceed with extractive activities, subject to the implementation
of safeguards.
Throughout the report, Professor Anaya explicitly endorses the independent responsibility
of extractive companies to respect the rights of indigenous peoples, irrespective of a state’s
compliance with its own duties. This is accomplished by undertaking human rights due
diligence at the very earliest stages of exploration and when purchasing properties to “avoid
acquiring tainted assets” where permits were obtained in violation of indigenous rights.78 The
independent responsibility also applies when companies have effectively been delegated the
state’s duty to consult and engage in direct consultation and negotiations with indigenous
peoples.79 Concluded agreements should address impact mitigation and provide for genuine
partnership, sharing of benefits, and grievance mechanisms.80
The 2013 mapping report of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and Environment,
Professor Knox, identified similar substantive and procedural rights of indigenous peoples
that are threatened by environmental harm.81 Notably, the independent expert highlights
Professor Anaya’s 2010 observation that the greatest challenge for companies arises in states
that fail to formally or fully recognize an indigenous people in their territory, creating the
danger that companies will use this “as an excuse not to apply the minimum international
standards applicable to indigenous rights.”82 In this situation, due diligence requires companies
to first identify the existence of indigenous peoples who may be affected, which, according to
Professor Knox, may be facilitated by reference to World Bank and IFC policies.83
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statement that no consultation is necessary where indigenous peoples have affirmatively withheld their
consent, and that they should be free from pressures compelling them to accept projects they do not
want. See text at n 71, above.

78

Anaya, 2013 Report, supra note 66 at paras 52–57. Due diligence also requires companies to not accept
permits from States in violation of duties of consultation and consent.

79

Ibid at paras 61–62. However, the State retains “ultimate responsibility for any inadequacy in consultation
or negotiation procedures” and “should employ measures to oversee and evaluate the procedures and their
outcomes, and especially to mitigate against power imbalances.”

80

Ibid at paras 72–78.

81

Knox, Indigenous Rights, supra note 38.

82

Ibid at 61.

83

Ibid.

64

JSDLP - RDPDD

Seck

2.3. Conclusions
While the rights of indigenous peoples and the environmental rights of individuals and/
or local communities are conceptualized differently under international law, there are clearly
overlaps, as well as distinctions. Environmental rights are both substantive and procedural,
and procedural environmental rights include rights to access information and to participate
in decision-making. However, international law does not appear to require states to seek
the consent of environmental rights holders, nor that businesses seeking to respect human
rights should do so where states have failed. Indigenous rights may also be substantive or
procedural, including the procedural right to FPIC. The list of substantive rights held by
indigenous peoples implicated in resource extraction includes many rights that may be equally
viewed as substantive environmental rights. However, the procedural right to FPIC as held
by indigenous peoples clearly extends beyond the content of procedural environmental rights
to consent, although arguably short of a veto. Finally, both Professors Anaya and Knox have
endorsed the business responsibility to respect rights.
A few additional considerations arise that are not explicitly addressed by either special
mandate holder. First, from an environmental human rights perspective, it is often considered
important to distinguish anthropocentric conceptions of rights from eco-centric conceptions,
which posit nature itself as the rights-holder.84 Clearly the contributions of both Professors
Knox and Anaya to the UNHRC are focused upon the need to secure rights to benefit humans,
whether individuals or peoples, rather than nature. Yet from an indigenous law perspective,
it may be argued that the distinction between land, mother earth, or nature and peoples is
untenable due to the reality of relationships and interdependence.85
A second consideration is the distinction between collective rights and individual rights.
While the rights of indigenous peoples are clearly collective rights, environmental human
rights may have an individual or collective character. For example, environmental rights may
be conceived as individual rights if grounded in civil and political rights (for example, the
rights to access information and judicial remedies to protect life and property), or as social and
economic rights (such as the right to health and the right to food,). Alternately, environmental
rights may be viewed as “third generation” rights that are held collectively by communities
(peoples) rather than individuals.86
Professor Knox does not address this conceptual question in his report, except for a
note that obligations may arise in relation to members of “groups in vulnerable situations”
including women, children, and indigenous peoples.87 This is in line with understandings
of participatory environmental rights under international sustainable development law as
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Attapatu, supra note 43 at 68–70. See also Dinah Shelton, “Environmental Rights” in Philip Alston, ed,
Peoples’ Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 189.

87

Knox, Mapping Report, supra note 37 at paras 69–78.

Seck

Volume 12: Issue 1

65

described by Pring and Noé.88 They further identify non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
as “increasingly powerful participants in environmental and resource development-decisionmaking,” although their role in providing a “voice for the voiceless” is sometimes critiqued for
failing to serve local needs.89 On the other hand, Pring and Noé identify “local communities”
as a separate category worthy of participation, in keeping with the Rio Declaration’s principle
22 which highlights the importance of participation by “other local communities” as well as
“indigenous peoples and their communities” in sustainable development.90 The idea that local
communities have a role to play as stakeholders if not rights-holders is clearly evident in the
international standards examined below.
3. International Finance Corporation
The IFC, one of the five members of the World Bank Group (WBG), is a multilateral
institution designed to assist in mobilizing financing for private sector enterprises investing in
developing countries.91 By sharing the WBG’s mission to reduce poverty, the IFC promotes
a sustainability framework comprised of a Policy on Environmental and Social Performance,
an Access to Information Policy, and the IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and
Social Sustainability (IFC Performance Standards).92 The original IFC Performance Standards
date from 1998 and were last updated in 2012. While the two policies outline the IFC’s
responsibility to ensure transparency, and environmental and social sustainability, the IFC
Performance Standards define companies’ responsibility to manage social and environmental
risks. They are broadly viewed as international standards for project financing by Equator
Principles financial institutions.93 They have also been identified as international standards
with which all extractive companies should comply.94
3.1. IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability
There are eight IFC performance standards that touch on a wide range of sustainability
concerns. Of particular interest are performance standard one (PS1), “Assessment and
Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts”; performance standard seven
(PS7), “Indigenous Peoples”; performance standard three (PS3), “Resource Efficiency and
88

See e.g. George R Pring & Susan Y Noé, “The Emerging International Law of Public Participation
Affecting Global Mining, Energy, and Resources Development” in Donald Zillman, Alastair R Lucas &
George R Pring, eds, Human Rights in Natural Resource Development: Public Participation in Sustainable
Development of Mining and Energy Resources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 11 at 58–68.
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Macklin, supra note 5 at 142–145.
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Pollution Prevention”; performance standard four (PS4), “Community Health, Safety and
Security”; performance standard five (PS5), “Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement”;
and performance standard six (PS6), “Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management
of Living Resources”.
3.1.1. Environmental Rights
Protection of environmental rights is embedded in many of the performance standards.
PS1 specifically identifies the business responsibility to respect human rights, noting that
each performance standard has human rights dimensions that can be identified if clients
are guided by the standards when engaging in due diligence.95 PS1 applies “from the early
developmental stages through the entire life cycle.”96 To comply, a client must “conduct a
process of environmental and social assessment, and establish and maintain an [Environmental
and Social Management System]” that is appropriate for the proposed project. This system will
incorporate: “(i) policy; (ii) identification of risks and impacts; (iii) management programs;
(iv) organizational capacity and competency; (v) emergency preparedness and response; (vi)
stakeholder engagement; and (vii) monitoring and review.”97 The process for the identification
of risks and impacts involves considering all relevant issues, including those identified
in performance standards two to eight. In “high risk circumstances”, PS1 notes it may be
appropriate to complement this process with “specific human rights due diligence as relevant
to the particular business.”98 However, according to Penelope Simons, citing John Ruggie, an
environmental and social impact assessment is not the same thing as a human rights impact
assessment, which must
force consideration of how the project could possibly interact with each and every
right. For example, an [environmental and social impact assessment] approach
might not result in any discussion of freedom of expression, whereas an [human
rights impact assessment] could envision a community protest against a project
being suppressed by State forces.99

Yet, when analyzed in further detail, PS1 does draw attention to direct and indirect
impacts on ecosystems on which affected communities’ livelihoods may depend.100 PS1
speaks to the importance of taking into account “the outcome of any engagement process with
Affected Communities”.101 Moreover, communication with affected communities in case of
emergency,102 and the involvement of affected communities in environmental monitoring are
discussed.103 The discussion of stakeholder engagement highlights that “responsive relationships”
are crucial for “successful management of environmental and social impacts” and may involve
95
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“stakeholder analysis and planning, disclosure and dissemination of information, consultation
and participation, grievance mechanism, and ongoing reporting to Affected Communities.”104
Exact details “may vary considerably” being “commensurate with the project’s risks and adverse
impacts, and the project’s phase of development.”105 With regard to consultation, the extent
required “should be commensurate with the project’s risks and adverse impacts and with the
concerns raised by the Affected Communities.” PS1 continues:
Effective consultation is a two-way process that should: (i) begin early in the process
of identification of environmental and social risks and impacts and continue on an
ongoing basis as risks and impacts arise; (ii) be based on the prior disclosure and
dissemination of relevant, transparent, objective, meaningful and easily accessible
information which is culturally appropriate …; (iii) focus inclusive engagement
on those directly affected as opposed to those not directly affected; (iv) be free of
external manipulation, interference, coercion, or intimidation; (v) enable meaningful
participation, where applicable; and (vi) be documented.106

Moreover, the consultation process should be tailored to the needs of “disadvantaged or
vulnerable groups.”107 Where projects have potentially significant adverse impacts on affected
communities, an “[i]nformed Consultation and Participation (ICP)” process will build upon
these steps and involve a “more in-depth exchange of views and information, and an organized
and iterative consultation” such that the client incorporate affected communities’ views into
decision-making “on matters that affect them directly,” and capture gendered differences.108
Where government processes do not meet the accepted standard, businesses will conduct a
complementary process to identify supplementary actions where appropriate.109 Clients are
also required to establish a grievance mechanism “to receive and facilitate resolution of Affected
Communities’ concerns and grievances” with regard to environmental and social performance,
which “should not impede access to judicial or administrative remedies.”110
PS3 provides guidance for pollution prevention and control, including the requirement
that clients justify the adoption of standards weaker than those in the WBG Environmental,
Health and Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines).111 PS4 aims to “anticipate and avoid adverse
impacts on the health and safety of [an] Affected Community” due to both “routine and
non-routine circumstances,” and to safeguard “personnel and property … in accordance with
relevant human rights principles and in a manner that avoids or minimizes risks to … Affected
Communities”.112 Of importance to situations of conflict or post-conflict, as well as conflicts
exacerbated by projects that “stress scarce local resources,”113 reference is to be made to the EHS
104
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Guidelines and other good international industry practice,114 with special attention to security
personnel and affected communities.115
PS5 addresses land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, arising “when affected
persons or communities do not have the right to refuse land acquisition or restrictions on land
use that result in physical or economic displacement.”116 Involuntary resettlement should be
avoided, for if not properly managed” it can “result in long-term hardship and impoverishment
for the Affected Communities and persons, as well as environmental damage and adverse
socio-economic impacts in areas to which they have been displaced.”117 This standard appears
to apply to displacement of local communities that are environmentally dependent but do not
self-identify as indigenous.
PS6 is guided by the Convention on Biological Diversity.118 It requires that the identification
of impacts take into account “the differing values attached to biodiversity and ecosystem
services by Affected Communities and, where appropriate, other stakeholders.”119 When
affected communities are likely to be impacted they should “participate in the determination
of priority ecosystem services” and adverse impacts should be avoided.120
3.1.2. Indigenous Rights
The fact that indigenous peoples might have rights beyond those of other potentially
affected communities is clearly recognized by PS7, which highlights that indigenous peoples
“may be more vulnerable to the adverse impacts associated with project development”
particularly “if their lands and resources are transformed, encroached upon, or significantly
degraded” leading to “loss of identity, culture, and natural resource-based livelihoods as well as
exposure to impoverishment and diseases.”121 Accordingly, PS7 seeks in part “[t]o ensure …
[that] the development process fosters full respect for the human rights, dignity, aspirations,
culture, and natural resource-based livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples.”122
PS7 notes that there is “no universally accepted definition” of “indigenous peoples” as
they may be referred to by different terms in different countries. In order to be recognized as
indigenous people, a group must: self-identify as “members of a distinct indigenous cultural
group” and be recognised as such by others; have a collective attachment to natural resources in
“geographically distinct habitats or ancestral territories”; have distinct “[c]ustomary, cultural,
economic, social or political institutions”; and, use a distinct language or dialect. 123
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PS7 also notes that clients may need to seek input from competent professionals to
determine whether a group is indigenous for the purpose of the standard.124
Having identified a group as indigenous, PS7 then outlines the way in which participation
and consent processes are to be enriched. This is achieved by including indigenous peoples’
representatives and organisations as well as members of the affected communities, and
providing sufficient time for indigenous decision-making processes. In addition, FPIC is
applied to “project design, implementation, and expected outcomes” where it is anticipated
that there will be:
•

“[I]mpacts on lands and natural resources subject to traditional ownership or
under customary use;”

•

“[R]elocation of indigenous peoples from lands and natural resources subject to
traditional ownership or under customary use;” or

•

Significant impacts on “critical cultural heritage”.125

PS7, then, clearly provides guidance that goes beyond that provided in the other performance
standards and takes into account the need to distinguish indigenous rights, including the right
to FPIC, from environmental rights of other local, directly affected communities. Whether
or not the rights protections that appear embedded in the IFC Performance Standards may be
“enforced” is a different matter to which we will now turn.
3.2. Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
The Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) has as its mission “to serve
as a fair, trusted, and effective independent recourse mechanism and to improve the social
and environmental accountability” of projects supported by the IFC and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).126 Established in 1999, the CAO serves three roles:
dispute resolution, compliance oversight, and independent advice.127
The CAO can only engage in a review of a complaint if it relates to a project in which the
IFC or MIGA is participating or actively considering, if the issues raised are environmental and
social in nature, and if the complainant is affected by the issues.128 The CAO is institutionally
independent from the IFC, with a centralized system and defined timeframes.129 Notably, the
CAO claims that it works with a “roster of global mediators with … appropriate language and
124
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cultural skills,” thus allowing the CAO to “provide a scalable, decentralized, adaptable response
aimed at ensuring accessibility for the parties and respect for indigenous dispute resolution.”130
In 2015, the CAO reported that it has handled over 150 cases from 46 countries during
its 15 year existence.131The mining, oil and gas, and chemicals industry accounted for 43% of
all cases, with the most common grievances including “policy compliance, consultation and
participation of communities, water pollution, and environmental and social management
systems.”132 Stakeholder engagement was a concern in 62% of all complaints, with 39% of
these raising issues of consultation and participation.133 Human rights were explicitly cited in
more than half of the cases, with environmental and indigenous rights being two of the three
most frequently raised human rights concerns. .134 .
A recent example is the complaint against Mindoro Resources Ltd., filed by two northern
indigenous Filipino communities in 2011. The complainants claimed the FPIC process was
flawed, and were concerned with environmental and cultural impacts on their ancestral
lands of a mining project funded by the IFC. After the CAO interviewed the indigenous
groups in question, along with other stakeholders and a wider group of indigenous peoples
who supported the project, the CAO was forced to forward the assessment report without
conclusions to CAO Compliance due to the lack of interest by the complainants in pursuing
dispute resolution with the company.135 By this time, the junior mining company, which had
also expressed reservations about the CAO process, had suspended the project.136 The CAO
subsequently noted that “this case raises issues regarding the effectiveness of IFC’s policies,
procedures and standards in managing the necessarily undefined downstream risks of early
stage investment in mining ventures.”137 From the perspective of the indigenous complainants
who wished to see the mining project stopped and their right to FPIC respected, the issue
has been at least temporarily resolved. However, it is not clear that the application of the IFC
Performance Standards and the involvement of the CAO were behind this result.138
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The IFC Performance Standards and a failure of stakeholder engagement were raised in a
2012 request for review of McEwan Mining’s activities in Argentina brought before Canada’s
Office of the CSR Counsellor (CSRC) by two local groups.139 The two requesters, the Centre
for Human Rights and Environment and Fundacion Ciudadanos Independientes, were
considered acceptable by the CSR Counsellor despite not being project-affected communities.
This was due to the location of the Minera Andes exploration site at “an elevation where
permanent human populations are not typically found.”140 The CSRC commenced a “situational
assessment” following methodology similar to that used by the IFC’s CAO, and concluded that
standards on transparency and information-sharing as well as stakeholder engagement might
be helpful for the company. However, McEwan Mining withdrew from the process before it
was complete,141 and subsequently refused to participate in either a facilitated dialogue or an
information-sharing process facilitated by the CSRC with the requestors.142 Unlike the CAO
process, the CSRC mechanism does not have any means to ensure that companies participate
in the process, although under the 2014 CSR Strategy a failure to participate will lead to
a withdrawal of trade commissioner services and government advocacy support abroad.143
Without such ability, the CSRC lacks the power to oversee company compliance with the IFC
Performance Standards.
3.3. Conclusions
The IFC Performance Standards do not directly align with either Professor Knox’s or
Professor Anaya’s reports. Yet, they clearly make several steps in the right direction. This
may be contrasted with the failure to adopt FPIC by the WBG’s public sector institutions.
Despite revisions in 1991 and 2005, the environmental and social safeguard policies of the
WBG’s public sector institutions do not endorse the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC.
Instead, they endorse the right to free, prior, and informed consultation, “resulting in ‘broad
community support’”.144 Although the World Bank launched a review of its safeguard policies
including indigenous peoples in 2012,145 the 2014 draft “includes the requirement of FPIC
resources-limited-mining-exploration-agusan-del-norte/>; Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Appraisal
Audit, supra note 136 at 14–15.
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but provides borrowees with an unacceptable, from an indigenous rights perspective, ‘opt-out’
option.”146 Having said this, it has also been argued that ambiguities were introduced into the
IFC Performance Standards by the development of guidance notes for implementation which
suggest FPIC may not be required prior to exploration as a complete impact assessment must
wait until a later stage in the project lifecycle.147 Moreover, despite the IFC’s incorporation of
the indigenous right to FPIC, there have been criticisms that the IFC Performance Standards
lack clarity as to “what should happen where indigenous consent is not forthcoming in contexts
other than relocation.” In these cases, the IFC has claimed that it will simply not fund such
projects.148
As demonstrated by the examples above, even if the IFC Performance Standards provide
useful guidance for businesses seeking to respect environmental and indigenous rights, nonjudicial mechanisms designed to promote compliance are underdeveloped and implementation
is not guaranteed. While the IFC Performance Standards may be legally binding as a condition
of financial support from the IFC and Equator Principles banks, indigenous peoples and local
communities are not parties to these contracts so cannot directly enforce them in law.149
Therefore, beyond critiques of the substance of the rights protections in the IFC Performance
Standards, it is important to pay attention to the structure and effectiveness of non-judicial
dispute resolution mechanisms such as the CAO and CSRC.
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4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)
4.1. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
The OECD MNE Guidelines date from 1976 and are an annex to the Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.150 In 1991, a chapter on environmental
protection was added.151 Subject to an extensive review in 2000, the OECD MNE Guidelines
now explicitly apply to MNEs and “all their entities in adhering countries and abroad.”152
The 2011 review added a chapter on human rights modeled on the 2011 UNGPs, and also
updated the chapter on environmental protection.153 As of 2014, 46 OECD and non-OECD
member countries combined adhere to the OECD MNE Guidelines, including non-members
Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Peru, Egypt, Morocco, Latvia, and Romania.154
Described as “recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises
operating in or from adhering countries,” the OECD MNE Guidelines “provide voluntary
principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws and
internationally recognized standards.”155 While the guidelines themselves are voluntary for
businesses, adhering states “make a binding commitment to implement them.”156 As a result,
adhering states commit to setting up national contact points (NCPs) in order to “further the
effectiveness” of the OECD MNE Guidelines.157
The OECD MNE Guidelines begin by noting that “[e]nterprises should take fully into
account established policies in the countries in which they operate, and consider the views
of other stakeholders.”158 The first two “general policies” state that enterprises should “[c]
ontribute to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable
development” and “[r]espect the internationally recognised human rights of those affected by
their activities.”159 Additional general policies support the idea that indigenous peoples and
local environmentally concerned communities are important. For example, paragraph 14 states
that enterprises should “[e]ngage with relevant stakeholders in order to provide meaningful
opportunities for their views to be taken into account in relation to planning and decision
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making for projects or other activities that may significantly impact local communities.”160 The
commentary elaborates that this requires “interactive processes” through “meetings, hearings
or consultation proceedings,” and to be “effective” requires “two-way communication”
that “depends on the good faith” of participants. This is identified as “particularly helpful”
in “planning and decision-making concerning projects or other activities involving … the
intensive use of land or water, which could significantly affect local communities.”161 Given
these general policies, one would have thought that more explicit guidance would be provided
in the relevant chapters on engagement with environmentally concerned local communities
and indigenous peoples. However, this is not the case. As will be seen below, the approach
taken by the OECD MNE Guidelines is one that ignores the rights of indigenous peoples, and
does not fully endorse participatory environmental rights. Yet, in a stand-alone chapter, the
OECD MNE Guidelines do fully endorse the business responsibility to respect human rights.
4.1.1. Environmental Rights
Chapter VI on environmental protection begins promisingly with an overarching
statement:
Enterprises should, within the framework of laws, regulation and administrative
practices in the countries in which they operate, and in consideration of relevant
international agreements, principles, objects, and standards, take due account of
the need to protect the environment, public health and safety, and generally to
conduct their activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable
development.162

Eight paragraphs then detail specific recommendations. First, enterprises should “establish
and maintain” appropriate environmental management systems by collecting information,
establishing targets, and monitoring and verifying progress. The second paragraph touches
upon access to information and public participation in environmental decision making.
Accordingly, enterprises should “provide the public and workers with adequate, measurable
and verifiable (where applicable) and timely information on the potential environment,
health and safety impacts of the activities of the enterprise.”163 In addition, enterprises should
“engage in adequate and timely communication and consultation with the communities
directly affected by the environmental, health and safety policies of the enterprise and by their
implementation.”164 However, these considerations are subject to the caveat that enterprises
“[t]ake into account concerns about cost, business confidentiality, and the protection of
intellectual property rights.”165 Enterprises should furthermore “assess and address” foreseeable
environmental and health impacts “associated with [their] processes, goods and services …
over their full life cycle”; however, only if “subject to a decision of a competent authority”
will enterprises prepare an environmental impact assessment for activities with significant
160
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impacts.166 These recommendations fall far short of those stated in IFC PS1 which mandates
in all cases a process of social and environmental assessment. In addition, per PS1, ongoing,
effective consultations must be tailored to the needs of vulnerable groups, and in cases of
potential serious adverse impact, must also account for gendered differences.167
Paragraphs four to eight contain additional recommendations. Paragraph four calls upon
enterprises to adopt a precautionary approach where scientific and technical risk assessments
identify threats of serious damage to the environment; while paragraph five provides that
enterprises should “[m]aintain contingency plans” and reporting mechanisms in the event
of serious damage including from accidents and emergencies.168 Paragraph six provides that
enterprises should seek to improve environmental performance at both the enterprise level and
throughout the supply chain through various means, including by adopting best performing
technologies and operating procedures, and educating and training workers in environmental
health and safety matters.169 Finally, paragraph eight calls on enterprises to “[c]ontribute to the
development of environmentally meaningful and economically efficient public policy.”170 While
the endorsement of a precautionary approach is commendable, the OECD MNE Guidelines,
like IFC PS6, fail to recognize that the value placed upon biodiversity and ecosystem services
may differ depending upon the values of the affected community. Consequently, it is crucial to
get affected communities involved in the identification of environmental impacts.171 Moreover,
the OECD MNE Guidelines make no reference to the challenges that land acquisition and
involuntary resettlement pose to directly affected communities challenges that IFC PS5
explicitly confronts.172
While paragraphs two and three particularly contribute to the realization of environmental
rights, these provisions do not live up to the participatory environmental rights identified by
the independent expert on human rights and the environment. Among other weaknesses, there
is no mention of access to remedy or justice in the event of harm. This again distinguishes
the OECD MNE Guidelines from the IFC Performance Standards, which in PS1 requires
clients to establish grievance mechanisms to address social and environmental concerns and
ensure that these mechanisms do not limit access to administrative or judicial remedies.173
Yet the commentary on the text of the environment chapter of the OECD MNE Guidelines
suggests that it “broadly reflects” principles of the Rio Declaration and “takes into account”
the “(Aarhus) Convention”.174 The commentary also suggests that information should be
provided transparently to encourage “active consultation with stakeholders” including local
communities and the public. Ultimately, the conclusion that “reporting and communication
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are particularly appropriate where scarce or at risk environmental assets are at stake”175 is far less
rigorous than the approach of the IFC Performance Standards, or an approach that explicitly
recognizes environmental rights.
4.1.2. Indigenous Rights
No specific chapter in the OECD MNE Guidelines addresses the rights of indigenous
peoples. Moreover, the chapter on environmental protection neither refers to consultation
with indigenous peoples nor to the importance of indigenous knowledge to environmental
decision-making.176 Where the OECD MNE Guidelines do refer to indigenous peoples, it is in
passing as part of a list of vulnerable groups, most notably in the commentary of the chapter
on human rights which states that “United Nations instruments have elaborated further on
the rights of indigenous peoples.”177 The failure to incorporate explicit reference to the rights
of indigenous peoples in the 2011 revisions to the OECD MNE Guidelines occurred despite
recommendations by the special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, among
others.178 While this could have been accomplished in a number of ways, the explicit addition
of a new chapter on indigenous peoples that mirrors the IFC PS7 would have been an easy
solution.
4.1.3. Human Rights
Despite the criticisms above, the OECD MNE Guidelines do include a chapter dedicated
to human rights which closely mirrors the business responsibility to respect rights under the
UNGPs. Consequently, it is relevant to both indigenous and environmental rights. According
to this chapter, enterprises should:
•

Respect human rights, which means they should avoid infringing on the human
rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which
they are involved.

•

Within the context of their own activities, avoid causing or contributing to
adverse human rights impacts and address such impacts when they occur.

•

Seek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly
linked to their business operations, products or services by a business relationship,
even if they do not contribute to those impacts.

•

Have a policy commitment to respect human rights.
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•

Carry out human rights due diligence as appropriate to their size, the nature
and context of operations and the severity of the risks of adverse human rights
impacts.

•

Provide for or co-operate through legitimate processes in the remediation of
adverse human rights impacts where they identify that they have caused or
contributed to those impacts.179

According to the commentary, the failure of a state to either “enforce relevant domestic
laws, or to implement international human rights obligations or the fact that it may act contrary
to such laws or international obligations does not diminish the expectation that enterprises
respect human rights.”180 Moreover, enterprises should seek to honour internationally
recognized human rights to the fullest extent possible, even where domestic law conflicts with
it, so long as this does not place the enterprise in violation of domestic law.181 In terms of the
rights of specific groups, including indigenous peoples, the commentary states that enterprises
“can have an impact on virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognized rights” and
that industry context may create a situation where heightened attention should be given to
rights at greater risk.182
Unlike the chapter on environmental protection, the chapter on human rights explicitly
“recommends that enterprises have processes in place to enable remediation” where human
rights violations have been identified.183 This could require co-operation with “judicial or
State-based non-judicial mechanisms” or the use of “operational-level grievance mechanisms”
provided such processes meet core criteria and are “based on dialogue and engagement.”184
Thus, while the OECD MNE Guidelines do not explicitly address indigenous rights, and
while the environmental chapter is weak, the inclusion of a chapter devoted to human rights
suggests that the OECD MNE Guidelines expect enterprises to respect indigenous rights as well
as environmental rights.185 However, the details of what this might entail are not elaborated in
the guidelines, and it is unclear what this might mean in practice.
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4.2. OECD National Contact Points
Every state adhering to the OECD MNE Guidelines is required to establish a NCP. NCPs
are tasked with promoting the guidelines, as well as “contributing to the resolution of issues that
arise relating to the implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances” in accordance with
procedural guidance.186 Adhering countries are given flexibility in terms of the institutional
structure of their NCPs, and as a result there are wide differences between.187
The procedure for the resolution of specific instances requires the NCP to initially assess
whether the issues raised have merit, and if so, to offer to “help the parties involved to resolve
the issues.”188 This may require seeking advice from other relevant stakeholders, consulting
NCPs in concerned countries, seeking guidance from the Investment Committee on the
interpretation of the OECD MNE Guidelines, and ultimately offering to facilitate access to
conciliation or mediation. Results of these procedures are to be made publicly available after
consultation with the parties, “taking into account the need to protect sensitive business
and other stakeholder information.”189 However, many NCP procedures have been heavily
criticized as ineffective, under-resourced and worse.190
According to a survey of NCP-submitted specific instances in the OECD’s database,191
supplemented by information from OECD Watch including its shadow data-base,192 there
were approximately 127 specific instances raised with NCPs between 2011 and mid-2015. Of
these, and bearing in mind that some have multiple themes, 65 related to general policies, 65
to human rights, and 31 to the environment. Of these, 15 had human rights and environment
dimensions, of which eight were related to the mining industry. According to OECD Watch,
between the adoption of the 2011 updated OECD MNE Guidelines and 2014, 36 percent
of all filed complaints were rejected for lack of merit, while 19 percent were concluded. This
means that either the complaint was resolved with a joint agreement between the parties or
it was not resolved and the NCP issued a statement.193 Of the specific instances relating to
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environmental and human rights concerns in the mining industry that arose between 2011
and 2014, one, filed with the UK NCP, resulted in a joint public statement in which the
company agreed to rapidly conclude its operations and not “conduct any operations in any
other World Heritage site.”194
Interestingly, several NCP decisions prior to the 2011 update of the OECD MNE
Guidelines addressed concerns of indigenous peoples in an arguably constructive manner,
despite the lack of specific guidance from the OECD on either human rights or indigenous
rights. In the Vedanta complaint concerning the indigenous Dongria Kondh in India, the UK
NCP interpreted “adequate and timely communication and consultation” under the chapter
on environmental protection with reference to article 10 of the Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines.
These guidelines are promoted under the Convention on Biological Diversity, to which both the
UK and India are a party.195 In a complaint against Intex Resources with regard to the Mindoro
Nickel Project in the Philippines, the Norwegian NCP concluded that while the company had
obtained the FPIC of some indigenous peoples, it did not systematically investigate at an early
stage whether other indigenous peoples with ancestral rights to the land should also have been
engaged.196 In a 2011 conclusion, the NCP recommended that the company, which endorsed
international standards,197 should engage in human rights due diligence in according with the
UNGPs, apply the IFC PS7 on indigenous peoples, follow IFC standards for environmental
assessment and management, and follow the IFC practice for the establishment of a grievance
mechanism.198 Both the UK NCP199 and the Norwegian NCP200 have been rated favourably
among their peers.
194
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A more recent Canadian NCP201 example considering indigenous rights provides a stark
contrast to the pre-2011 Norwegian and UK approaches. In 2013, three NGOs brought a
request for review of the mining activities of Corriente Resources Inc. and CRCC-Tongguan
Investment (Canada) Co. Ltd., carried out through the Ecuador-based company EcuaCorreinte
at the Mirador mine in the province of Zamora Chinchipe, Ecuador.202 The review request
alleged a lack of respect for “right to prior consultation of the general population based on
environmental risks and lack of free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous population
and environmental consultation” as well as allegations of forced displacement, state suppression
of social protests, and risks to biodiversity and ecological integrity, among other issues.203 The
July 2014 assessment closed the specific instance on the basis that all claims were without
merit. Notably, the NCP concluded in part that the OECD MNE Guidelines do not require
FPIC.204 The NCP also considered Ecuadorean court decisions that had rejected similar claims,
and expressed the view that environmental claims have been inadequately substantiated.205 An
added complication was corporate structure, as the NCP was confronted by the claim that
onsite decision making was made by EcuaCorriente while the project was managed by Chinabased CRCC-Tongguan. Thus, despite Corriente’s incorporation in a Canadian province,
relevant operations were handled by corporations registered in non-OECD countries; resulting
in Corriente’s refusal to engage in a dialogue facilitated by the Canadian NCP.206
In 2014, a request for review was submitted by the NGO Canada Tibet Committee with
regards to China Gold International Resources operation of the Gyama copper-polymetallic
mine in China’s Tibet Autonomous Region.207 The request, arising after 83 miners were buried
201
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in a landslide, alleged a lack of adequate environmental due diligence, a failure to respect human
rights including through forced evictions, and a failure to disclose accurate environmental and
health and safety risks to local communities.208 In its final statement issued in April 2015, the
NCP found that the issues presented in the request were partially substantiated and required
further investigation. However, China Gold International Resources “did not engage or respond
to the Canadian NCP’s correspondence and follow-up outreach” and without participation by
both parties, the NCP was “unable to conduct dialogue facilitation for the Parties and [closed]
the Specific Instance.”209 Nevertheless, the NCP made clear that in accordance with the
2014 Strategy, “the Company’s non-participation in the NCP process [would] be taken into
consideration in any applications by the Company for enhanced advocacy support from the
Trade Commissioner Service and/or Export Development Canada (EDC) financial services,
should they be made.”210
These examples suggest that the structure of the NCP and related implementation
pressures may be as or more important than the content of the OECD MNE Guidelines when
it comes to the willingness and ability of NCPs to take claims of violation of participatory
environmental rights and FPIC of indigenous peoples seriously. Notably, the Canadian NCP
has been frequently criticized for being so ineffective that the substance of claims could not
be considered.211 According to Simons and Macklin, while the Dutch NCP is well resourced
and consists of a body of “four Independent Experts and four government advisors, with two
full-time staff,” the Canadian NCP consists of “an interdepartmental committee” chaired
by Global Affairs Canada (previously the DFAIT) with members from departments that
“support and promote Canadian business overseas”, including Natural Resources Canada and
Industry Canada.212 This creates the potential for conflicts of interest that are not present
in the independent structure of the Netherlands.213 Other criticisms of both Canadian and
other NCPs include procedural concerns over transparency, confidentiality, timeliness, and
the voluntary nature of corporate participation.214 Moreover, according to OECD Watch,
accessibility to NCP processes is a major concern, and NCPs should ensure that complainants
are not held to an onerous standard of proof at the initial assessment stage, that allegations
Exchange. China Gold is the only overseas listing of the largest gold producer in China, China National
Gold Group Corporation (“China National Gold”), which is a state-owned enterprise. In 2010, China
Gold acquired the Gyama mine from China National Gold.
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relating to future harms are accepted, and that an assessment of “the risk of reprisals and
other security risks” facing complainants are undertaken and, where possible, mitigated.215 This
last concern is particularly poignant in the Canadian context given the mysterious death in
December 2014 of an Indigenous leader actively opposed to the mine that was the subject of
the rejected Correinte NCP complaint, “the third vocal critic of the Mirador mine to be killed
in recent years”.216
4.3. OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance
The OECD has recognized that the OECD MNE Guidelines alone provide insufficient
guidance for mining, oil and gas companies when engaging with stakeholders. Consequently,
in March 2013, the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct constituted an
advisory group “to provide substantive input” on the development of the draft.217 The advisory
group, co-chaired by Canada and Norway, is comprised of OECD and non-OECD countries,
as well as participants from industry (the oil and gas, mining and metals sectors), civil society,
trade unions, indigenous peoples’ representatives, and international organizations.218 In 2014,
OECD-Watch expressed concerns that FPIC of indigenous peoples might not be endorsed
during the development of this guidance.219 A draft text of the OECD Stakeholder Engagement
Guidance was posted for public comment in April 2015 with comments accepted until midJune, and the final text was made publicly available in 2016.220
The OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance situates the importance of engaging with
stakeholders in terms of both avoiding adverse impacts to human rights and the environment
and contributing to business value through the attainment of a “social licence to operate”
while improving corporate risk profile.221 The Foreword makes clear that it “refers to existing
standards to help enterprises observe them and undertake risk-based due diligence”.222 While
the guidance refers to “the most relevant parts of the OECD MNE Guidelines and other
standards,” its intention is not to be a substitute for them.223 Importantly, the Foreword clarifies
that “[n]ot all adherents” to the OECD MNE Guidelines “endorse the standards considered”
in the OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance.224 This qualification is of considerable concern
given the lack of guidance on indigenous and local community rights within the OECD MNE
Guidelines themselves.
215
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The OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance was developed for use by “stakeholder
facing staff” that is, “on-the-ground personnel of extractive sector enterprises that come into
contact with communities and stakeholders” and staff in larger firms who are “responsible for
stakeholder engagement.”225 It is comprised of five sections. The first provides an overview of
processes.226 The second, “Recommendations to Corporate Planning,” is designed to ensure
adequate prioritisation of stakeholder engagement at the “organisational level”.227 The third and
most extensive section is “Recommendations to On-the-ground personnel,” which provides
“practical due diligence guidance for ensuring that stakeholder engagement is effective.”228 The
fourth section is found in annex A and outlines a “Monitoring and Evaluation Framework
for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement” in table form.229 Finally, four thematic annexes
provide guidance on engagement with groups that are identified as having a “unique status
and potential vulnerabilities” these are indigenous peoples (Annex B), women (Annex C),
workers (Annex D), and artisanal and small-scale miners (Annex E).230 This goes beyond the
IFC Performance Standards by providing stand-alone guidance on the rights of women (which
are lightly integrated into the IFC Performance Standards) and artisanal and small-scale miners
(which are essentially not addressed in the IFC Performance Standards).
Before delving into the guidance itself, the introduction helpfully clarifies terminology.
First, “due diligence” is defined as “the process through which enterprises identify, prevent
and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts and account for how these impacts are
addressed.”231 The OECD MNE Guidelines recommend that a “risk-based due diligence”
be carried out, which may be scaled according to the particular situation.232 The risks to
be identified encompass the “range of issues covered by the OECD Guidelines including
disclosure, human rights, employment and industrial relations, environment, combating
bribery, bribe solicitation and extortion, and consumer interests.”233 Secondly, “meaningful
stakeholder engagement” is defined as “ongoing engagement with stakeholders that is twoway, conducted in good faith and responsive.”234 The importance of stakeholders themselves
being “actively involved in driving engagement activities” is highlighted.235 While the original
draft Guidance made clear that “a refusal to engage with extractive corporations or approve of
an extractive operation does not equate [with] ‘bad faith’ on the part of stakeholders, barring
the use of violence or deception,”236 this text was replaced in the final text with the statement
225
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“‘good faith’ engagement depends on the participants of both sides of engagement.”237 The
relationship between due diligence and meaningful stakeholder engagement is also clarified,
stating that “stakeholder engagement is an important means of implementing due diligence”
because “stakeholders themselves can contribute important knowledge to help identify
potential or actual impacts on themselves or their surroundings.”238 However, unless “properly
supported, developed or executed”, stakeholder engagement may fail to avoid adverse impacts,
while bad stakeholder engagement activities may actually “give rise to actual or perceived
adverse impacts.”239 This is reminiscent of stakeholder engagement as discussed in the IFC
PS1, yet with clearer explanation of the relationship between due diligence and stakeholder
engagement.
The introduction continues by helpfully clarifying the differences between “stakeholders”
and “rights-holders”.240 Stakeholders are “persons or groups who are or could be directly
or indirectly affected by a project or activity”.241 Furthermore, stakeholders “for whom the
risk of adverse impacts is greatest or the potential adverse impact is severe or could become
irredeemable” are to be given priority for due diligence purposes.242 These include:
•

potentially impacted local communities (including nomadic communities [and]
communities living near an extractives concession, downstream from a river near
the site, or along a transport route or near associated infrastructure such as energy
grids or processing plants)

•

indigenous peoples

•

farmers

•

workers (including local and migrant workers)

•

artisanal miners

•

host governments (local, regional and national)

•

local civil society organisations, community-based organizations and local human
rights defenders.243

In addition, other “interested stakeholders that may be important for meaningful
engagement” include: NGOs, industry peers, investors/shareholders, business partners, and
the media.244 The scope of stakeholders to be considered is thus more expansive than that of the
IFC PS1, which reserves meaningful engagement for those “directly affected”.245
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By contrast, the discussion of rights-holders notes that “[a]ll people have human rights
and thus all stakeholders as individuals are “rights-holders”. However, not all stakeholders
will have their human rights put at risk or impacted by an extractive project and its associated
activities.246 Accordingly, it is important for a distinction to be made to enable the recognition
of rights-holders such as “individuals living in a community whose only local water source may
be polluted by an extractive operation” as well as “certain groups such as indigenous and tribal
peoples” who “can have collective rights and consequently the group itself would be considered
a rights-holder.”247 This suggests an important distinction that is not made explicit in the IFC
Performance Standards.
The introduction further distinguishes “informing/reporting”, “consulting”, “negotiating”,
and “responding” as distinct “modes of engagement”.248 Finally, the introduction highlights
differences between industry sectors, noting that mining and oil and gas may give rise to
different stakeholder concerns due to various factors influencing impacts, including: the
method of extracting resources, the location of resources, methods of processing and transport,
project life spans, and the structure of licensing processes and contracts.249
The recommendations to on-the-ground personnel are by far the most comprehensive
and so will be the subject of analysis here. While the concepts underpinning participatory
environmental rights do arise on occasion, it is clear that this perspective on rights was
not central to the development of this guidance. For example, reference is made to the
importance of impact assessment for information gathering purposes, and identifies Social and
Environmental Impact Assessment and Human Rights Impact Assessment as possible tools,
in a somewhat similar manner to that of the IFC Performance Standards.250 Environmental
baselines and impact assessments are identified as important primary document-based sources
for understanding local and operating context,251 as is the identification of potential cumulative
impacts.252 Yet, while specific types of information are identified as important here (for example,
human rights, economy and employment, cultural factors, socio-economic factors, gender
factors, etc.), there is no explicit stand-alone consideration of environmental impacts, nor are
environmental issues clearly intertwined with other identified factors.253 Even a table designed
specifically to identify potential human rights impacts of extractive activities is curiously
weak in its explicit identification of environmental rights. However, this may be explained
by the table’s grounding of rights identification in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
rather than on other equally authoritative sources of international human rights law.254 As a
consequence, there are frequent references to concerns triggering rights to livelihood, food,
246
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and health, as well as rights to life, and security of person, among others.255 Moreover, the
guidance is silent on the possibility that local communities or other stakeholders might attach
“differing values … to biodiversity and ecosystem services,” and that this is important to the
identification of impacts, as identified in the IFC Performance Standards.256
While in the draft Stakeholder Engagement Guidance there was a single reference to “a
local community seeking to defend its right to a healthy environment” in a context of tensions
arising from large-scale arrivals of external workers seeking jobs,257 this is reworded in the
final text to impacts on the right to an adequate standard of living including the right to
food, housing, and cultural life..258 Concerns are raised about the depletion of local water
sources,259 groundwater contamination,260 and environmental degradation more generally,261
which are explicitly linked to the right to health. However, there is no reference to substantive
environmental rights to water or a healthy environment, for example, or to the importance of
procedural environmental rights. Of course, this is not so different from the IFC Performance
Standards, which do not explicitly integrate human rights language, despite embracing in
spirit the importance of affected community environmental concerns, ecosystem values, and
interrelated livelihoods.
Reference is made to the importance of respecting rights guaranteeing security of the
person and freedom of expression, especially where landowners peacefully protesting an
overland pipeline are being removed from their land. Yet, linkage of peaceful protests and
security risks to environmental concerns, particularly for those without property rights, is
absent.262 More helpfully, the guidance addresses the establishment of grievance mechanisms to
handle adverse impacts and identifies rehabilitation, defined as “the restoration of land, water
or air quality,” as among possible responses.263 This aligns with the IFC Performance Standards
and is an important improvement over the chapter on environmental protection in the OECD
MNE Guidelines.
On the other hand, despite the lack of explicit reference to procedural environmental
rights, the OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance is rich in practical content on each
identified step of due diligence. The process involves, first, ensuring that on-the-ground
personnel understand the local context by consulting the right multi-disciplinary sources from
law to fieldwork and vetting it for accuracy; and second, identifying priority stakeholders
255
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(rights-holders and vulnerable groups) and verifying their representatives.264 Step three requires
establishing support systems to ensure stakeholder engagement is meaningful, both within the
company and through its support to stakeholders, while ensuring that activities are appropriately
resourced.265 Step four discusses appropriate and effective stakeholder engagement activities
and processes. It provides guidance on which of the four modes is “needed or required”:
information sharing, consultation/learning, negotiation, or consent. Step four then provides
guidance on how to implement commitments, address adverse impacts and share benefits,
respond to grievances, and ensure remediation when appropriate.266 Steps five and six address
the importance of follow-ups and monitoring stakeholder’s engagement activities to respond
to shortcomings.267
The discussion of impacted community consent in the OECD Stakeholder Engagement
Guidance makes clear that consent may be a “legal or operational requirement or an expectation
in some operating contexts,” that, while arising “particularly in the context of engagement with
indigenous peoples” may also arise in other contexts.268 It is said to be particularly relevant
to “engagement prior to feasibility studies, project exploration and project development, or
prior to major expansions.”269 Consent can be indicated in many ways, “inclu[ding] majority
vote from the community, approval of a traditional decision-making body such as a council
of elders, organised regional referendum or other forms determined by regulation or other
mechanism defining the requirement for consent, or by agreement between the enterprise
and the affected persons themselves.”270 This is clearly more expansive than the consultation
rights understood to be part of procedural environmental rights, although it is not explicitly
identified here as a “right”.
Annex B, dedicated to indigenous rights, clearly highlights the importance of the legal
dimension of the obligations owed to indigenous peoples, including the local regulatory
context, customary land tenure, as well as indigenous self-governance legal systems.271
Moreover, the challenge of identifying indigenous peoples is highlighted where they are not
recognized by local law, in which case the guidance states “self-identification as indigenous
should be regarded as a fundamental criterion for identifying indigenous peoples.”272 Here,
the idea that indigenous peoples have a “special connection to and/or rights to ancestral
lands” even if not officially recognized, is matched with the importance of understanding
intangible values associated with “sacred sites or areas of cultural significance.”273 However,
the actual guidance on whether or not consent is required highlights the fact that while other
264
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international instruments recognize FPIC for indigenous peoples, the OECD MNE Guidelines
themselves are silent on this.274 Moreover, according to the guidance, FPIC is not mandated in
some states.275 In this situation, enterprises should “consider local expectations, the risks posed
to indigenous peoples and to the operations as a result of local opposition.” 276 The key for
companies is to be able to meet the “legitimate expectations of indigenous peoples” without
violating domestic laws.277 Should an indigenous community withhold consent or refuse to
engage, and a company conclude through its due diligence process that consent is required,
“activities should not proceed.”278
5. Conclusions
This paper has explored the treatment of environmental and indigenous rights, as embedded
within two different international standards promoted by the Canadian government, to
extractive companies operating internationally. While the approach taken in each was notably
different, particularly with regard to the recognition of indigenous rights, the recently released
OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance takes a considerable step forward both in terms of its
explicit identification of the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC and in its expansive treatment
of stakeholder consent whether or not local communities self-identify as indigenous. Despite
this, it cannot yet be said that an extractive company seeking guidance from these standards in an
honest attempt to respect environmental rights and the rights of indigenous peoples in overseas
operations would have a clear idea of what steps to take. Moreover, if an environmentally
affected community indigenous or not were to seek information, participation, or remedy if
not consent through either the OECD NCP process, the IFC CAO, or the Canadian CSRC,
it appears unlikely that there would be a satisfactory conclusion.
There appear to be two issues. First, while there is clearly a difference between procedural
environmental rights and the indigenous right to FPIC under international law, this distinction
is blurred in the international guidance. This may be for a good reason. For example, where
the identification of a local community as indigenous or not is contested by the state in which
a company is operating, there may be advantages to having a fall back standard that applies
to all affected local communities. However, the treatment of local community engagement
in the IFC Performance Standards, the OECD MNE Guidelines, and the OECD Stakeholder
Engagement Guidance also appears to distinguish between the legal status of these approaches.
While indigenous peoples are clearly identified as having legal rights under international law
(whether or not these are recognized by the host state), non-indigenous affected communities
appear more likely to be treated as stakeholders rather than rights-holders. This too has
advantages and disadvantages to the extent that guidance suggests that stakeholders may in
some circumstances be entitled to consent, the substance of entitlement goes beyond what
non-indigenous communities would be entitled to as part of procedural environmental rights
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as described in this paper .279 However, by treating the community engagement process as a
non-legal entitlement (stakeholders, rather than rights-holders), there may be a temptation to
devalue the importance of non-indigneous local communities, a worrying situation given the
prevalence of violence against environmental human rights defenders.280 This situation could
be alleviated if proper attention was paid to the respect of procedural environmental rights,
irrespective of the indigenous status of the local communities.
The second issue relates to the process of resolution of complaints. The extensive reference
to international standards by independent and well-resourced OECD NCPs beyond the
OECD MNE Guidelines, including those of the IFC, suggests that process and substance may
be intertwined. If the content of the final OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance is weaker
in its indigenous rights protections than the IFC Performance Standards, for example, it may
discourage independent NCPs from seeking guidance beyond the confines of the OECD.
This is particularly worrisome, given the clear statement in the OECD Stakeholder Engagement
Guidance that not all adhering states accept its content. This statement could be read as a signal
to NCPs to inquire into whether or not the state in which the operations take place or an
NCP home state agree with the content, rather than asking whether the company itself aspires
or is obligated under international human rights law to comply with the highest standards
of rights respecting best practice. The statement is also misleading in so far as it could be
taken to suggest that states may choose to accept or not accept human rights obligations that
have acquired customary international law status. Clearer and more frequent endorsement of
business responsibilities to respect environmental and indigenous rights by UN human rights
mechanisms might assist in overcoming the limitation of prevalent state-centric assumptions
about the respective duties and responsibilities of states and businesses.
Other questions remain. The OECD Stakeholder Engagement Guidance is a document
of potentially great importance due to the “interpretive function of the OECD Investment
Committee supported by its Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct” in the
development of “more granular guidance for specific industry sectors and operating contexts.”281
Moreover, the OECD MNE Guidelines bind state parties to provide an implementation
mechanism in the form of an NCP process.282 Yet, the regional and geographic distribution of
committed parties does not include key BRICS283 nations like the Russian Federation, India,
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or China,284 although the OECD is actively engaging with emerging market states including
China and India.285 The IFC Performance Standards, emanating from a member of the WBG
and endorsed by Equator Principles financial institutions, would appear to have more universal
influence, although limited in practice as a condition of financing projects in developing
countries.286 The endorsement of indigenous rights to FPIC is therefore notable. However, the
potential for states to opt out of the World Bank’s revised operational policy on indigenous
peoples is concerning. Moreover, the announcement of a new development bank formed by
BRICS countries raises questions as to what if any standards it might endorse in its policies.287
The focus of this article has been on the relationship between international law on the rights
of indigenous and environmentally affected communities as well as international standards for
mining companies operating outside of Canada. While Canada claims leadership in this area, it
is often viewed as a laggard as a consequence of its reluctance to endorse the rights of indigenous
peoples to FPIC both internationally and within Canada, due to concerns over the interpretation
of aboriginal rights by Canadian courts.288 This was accompanied in 2012 by the weakening of
procedural environmental rights protections in environmental assessment at the federal level.289
Research identifying and analyzing the treatment of indigenous and environmental rights in
international standards promoted by non-OECD countries to extractive industries operating
internationally thus becomes a crucial consideration. Interestingly, a recent policy adopted by
China for outbound investment in mining explicitly endorses the right of indigenous peoples
to FPIC.290
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By comparison, and unlike the mining policy framework promoted through the
Intergovernmental Forum, the 2014 Strategy does not elaborate upon the rights of indigenous
peoples.291 Instead, it refers frequently to the importance of “community engagement” and
the need for Canada to provide “improved guidance related to stakeholder engagement” so
as to prevent disputes through early detection and resolution.292 Moreover, the 2014 Strategy
explicitly notes that the role of the CSRC office will “include strengthened guidance on
developing meaningful, effective dialogue between companies and communities.”293 A key
question, then, is what form that guidance will take, and whether it will reflect the rights of
indigenous peoples to FPIC, procedural environmental rights, and/or stakeholder engagement
that is not rights based. Given Canada’s role as a co-chair of the Advisory Group on the OECD
Stakeholder Engagement Guidance, the combination of this new guidance, together with any
changes in the implementation roles played by both Canada’s OECD NCP and the CSRC,
will be important developments to watch.

English text of this guidance endorses the business responsibility for human rights and FPIC for
indigenous peoples (at 2.4.1–2.4.5).
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